Governance reconstruction · 2008–2022

Two Competing Governance Records: Comunidad, Exploitation and the Disputed Majority (2008-2022)

The evidence is clearer when the record is shown in parallel rather than compressed into a single institutional story. One lane begins with the 2008 ownership/exploitation architecture and later majority-side/CEXP records. The other follows the disputed Owners’ Community record from 2011 onward. The question is whether that second lane became a capture mechanism—not whether the label can be assumed in advance.

Track B · baseline / comparator

Majority & exploitation record

2008 constitutional/exploitation instruments, majority-backed records, later LPB/Gil meetings and separate CEXP governance. CEXP and Owners’ Community records are never merged.

Track A · disputed lineage

Owners’ Community record, 2011+

Meetings where debt, payment status, voting eligibility, offices, certificates, litigation, security/access and later authority interact. Every act remains subject to meeting-specific legal and economic testing.

2022+ · separate epoch

Successor phase

CAM/JDAM/HNT-era governance belongs to a materially different title/control period. Upstream dependencies may matter, but the original 2011 capture hypothesis should not simply be extended by label.

Capture hypothesis · causal spine to test

What would a capture mechanism actually require?

  1. CostsWho was contractually/economically bearing common operating expenditure?
  2. DebtWere overlapping or wrong-debtor charges attributed to LPB?
  3. Vote filterWas LPB lawfully treated as unable to vote?
  4. Apparent majorityDid the remaining eligible pool then control resolutions?
  5. Authority outputsOffices, certificates, litigation, records, security, access.
  6. PropagationWere those outputs later relied on by courts, the AC, authorities or counterparties?
What would defeat or materially narrow the hypothesis?
  • A valid, due and non-duplicative debt ledger supporting the payment-status filter.
  • Correct meeting notice, proxies, ownership denominator and voting thresholds for each resolution.
  • Proof that the relevant Community body possessed the material authority later attributed to it.
  • Contractual/CEXP and tourism-enabling instruments supporting the claimed shift in operational powers.
  • Primary records inconsistent with the current reconstruction.

The record in parallel

Two lanes, with the downstream control event kept separate.

The timeline distinguishes Community minutes, CEXP records, comparator meetings, litigation and physical-control events.

2008
Track B · baseline

29 April / 26 May / 15 July 2008

CEXP/exploitation architecture and a strong majority baseline. These records establish the pre-rupture structure but are not presented as immune from procedural scrutiny.

2011
Foundational fork

2 February 2011

New Community offices are elected. The minutes themselves recognise that hotel operation/tourism matters are outside ordinary Community competence.

2011
Matrix minute

22 June 2011

LPB is recorded present with about 72.976% but treated as unable to vote because of attributed Community debt. Debt, claims, lawyers, CEXP-maintenance termination and administration arrangements converge.

2012
Comparator

10 August 2012

Working records indicate a majority-side meeting where necessary accounts/information were unavailable and decisions were not simply forced through. Signed-original/book reconciliation remains required.

2014
Competing record

10 April & 28 August 2014

LPB/Gil-side Owners’ Community record plus a separate signed CEXP record. The 2014 Community appointment was later suspended on an interim basis; the CEXP record must remain analytically distinct.

2015
Voting divergence

19 November 2015

Approximately 89.02% is recorded present/represented but only 0.770% listed with votes. A large alleged debt and retroactive fee issue appear in the same governance context. Exact figures require signed-original reconciliation.

2016
Primary source

26 April 2016

89.727% present/represented; LPB 72.976%; only 11.039% treated as vote-eligible. The act records incomplete 2010–2015 accounting, non-approval of those accounts, then later governance votes, a retrospective quota reduction and changed arrears/debt-enforcement authority.

Open the public redacted source edition →

2016
Knowledge / reconciliation bridge

April–June 2016 · PwC / accounting work

Contemporaneous work examines who paid common-type costs, who should bear them, alleged Community debt, voting consequences, private-owner/access issues and the insolvency interface. This is evidence that the mechanism was being investigated contemporaneously—not a finding that PwC accepted any later legal conclusion.

2017
Continue audit

12 June 2017

Further disputed-lineage Community record; the 2008 statutes/contract/acta were being used contemporaneously to challenge the Community position.

2017
Separate CEXP record

2017 CEXP governance

Exploitation-side governance. It cannot be treated as an Owners’ Community act merely because it concerns the same hotel.

2018
Finca-by-finca audit

18 May 2018

Major control/security-era minute. A contemporaneous legal calculation reportedly reduced the supporting ownership vote to about 0.385%, but that figure remains unverified until reconstructed finca by finca.

2018
Downstream physical-control event

7 June 2018

The clearest currently documented hotel access/control event: keys, locks/chains, security and service-control consequences. It is not itself a Community minute and should not be backdated into a claim of whole-hotel physical eviction in 2011.

2018
Operational reliance

5 July & 20 November 2018

Post-control Community records requiring literal-source and downstream-reliance tracing: who relied on each minute, for what access/security/authority proposition, and with what ownership/voting basis?

19–21
Completeness gap

2019–2021

Originals, convocations, proxies, voting sheets and annexes still need a completeness audit before the repository presents an uninterrupted series.

2022
New epoch

4 February 2022 onward

Successor ownership/control phase. Analyse upstream dependencies, but do not treat these minutes as simply more evidence of the original 2011 hypothesis.

Voting-filter visual

The issue is not merely who attended—it is who was counted as able to decide.

Bars reproduce source-recorded percentages or clearly labelled approximations. They do not decide whether the payment-status filter was lawful.

22 Jun 2011

LPB majority present, vote excluded

LPB recorded participation~72.976%

Eligible remainder not visualised as a percentage here because the exact meeting denominator/filter requires reconstruction.

19 Nov 2015

Attendance vs listed voting power

Present / represented~89.02%
Listed with votes0.770%

Approximate source reading; signed-original hundredths still to be reconciled.

26 Apr 2016

Primary-source voting filter

Present / represented89.727%
LPB72.976%
Vote-eligible pool11.039%
18 May 2018

Do not hard-code the reported 0.385%

A contemporaneous calculation reportedly reaches about 0.385% supporting ownership vote. The page deliberately does not turn that into a quantitative bar until title, proxies and denominator are rebuilt finca by finca.

Primary-source control for 26 April 2016

The public redacted edition omits personal contact/banking identifiers and non-essential private financial detail while preserving the governance-relevant meeting facts and the private-source hash.