AFFIRMATIVE JUDICIAL ACTS AND OMISSIONS · PREVARICATION ALLEGATION
Gil alleges direct judicial intervention through resolutions and refusals, as well as delays and omissions. Each conduct requires its own criminal-law test.
Gil directly alleges omissionary judicial prevarication. That is one dimension of the unitary accusation, not its limit: he also attributes affirmative resolutions and refusals alleged to have been knowingly unjust.
Gil Marer’s direct allegation.Gil alleges that Magistrate-Judge Alberto López Villarrubia’s role did not consist only of omissions. He attributes a unitary sequence of affirmative judicial acts—resolutions, refusals and evidential closures concerning protection of the hotel and estate, control and works, bidding/adjudication and, ultimately, adoption of accusatory propositions in Judgment 163/2023—together with delays and omissions of protection, restoration, investigation and accounting. Gil alleges that, with knowledge of a developed, finance-backed exit architecture, that sequence preserved or legitimised the private-control result and knowingly frustrated or sabotaged LPB’s exit from the insolvency. This is his direct criminal allegation, not an adjudicated criminal fact.
Financeable exit, one controlled meeting and contrary evidence.The record documents the convenio, viability plan and payment plan filed on 27 April 2017 and, by June 2018, signed hotel-operation instruments, an operator plan, due diligence, an ECO valuation, staged security and parallel finance routes. The controlled record identifies one direct meeting with the judge: the meeting Daniel Irigoyen reported contemporaneously on 13 June 2018, followed by a separate meeting with the insolvency administrator. His account says the judge allowed the route to be explored and asked that the application be pursued, which is contrary evidence against a simplistic continuous-obstruction theory. The June finance was conditional, and a later route reached an executed term sheet that remained subject to conditions. This supports a developed, financeable architecture; it does not establish multiple judge visits, unconditional funds, certain closing or guaranteed success, or that every annex was received or personally read by him.
Gil Marer’s direct allegation on condition allocation and destruction of the security route.Gil directly alleges that Aweswell had fulfilled, or was ready and able to fulfil, the sponsor-side and counterparty conditions within its lawful control. He alleges that the operative blocking conditions instead depended on preserving and delivering collateral and staged security, maintaining access for inspection, valuation and hotel operation, obtaining the court and insolvency-administrator outputs required by the finance documents, and preventing the adverse private/Community perimeter from disabling those inputs. In Gil’s account, the alleged private-control or lender-in-possession mechanism destroyed or made unavailable the security package, obstructed payment or consignment of the insolvency liabilities and prevented refinancing. This is Gil’s attributed causation and sabotage allegation, not a finding that every condition was satisfied, that closing was certain or that any identified actor caused the non-closing.
| Condition / route | Exact controlled status | Unresolved limit |
|---|
| Aweswell sponsor/counterparty side | Gil alleges that Aweswell had performed or could timely perform the sponsor-side matters within its control and could provide the required sponsor, guarantee, comfort, funding, operator and security documentation. | The reviewed June VSO copy does not establish executed Aweswell acceptance, a completed condition ledger or satisfaction or waiver of every condition. A later executed term sheet remained conditional and was not a facility agreement or drawdown. |
| ONA / Clubotel operating route | The recovered 6 June hotel-industry lease and suspensive addendum are signed by the Sun Park Owners’ Community and Clubotel La Dorada, S.L.; contemporaneous correspondence described ONA as the intended operator. Effect depended on sufficient funds being paid into Mercantil nº1 to permit LPB to exit the insolvency and on the required favourable owners’ resolution. | ONA was the operator context, not the funder. The record does not establish that ONA and Clubotel were the same legal person, that the Community could bind every property, that both suspensive conditions occurred or that operation commenced under the instrument. |
| Stoneweg / VSO finance | The lender-issued instrument was an Oferta Vinculante Condicionada to Aweswell for up to €15.5m, subject to first-ranking mortgages and the agreed 65% LTV; judicial authority for the VSO mortgages; an AC certificate that insolvency and estate liabilities did not exceed €13.84m; an acceptable first-class ECO valuation; Matkator legal/Registry due diligence; VSO management/credit-committee approval; and other corporate/control conditions. | Stoneweg’s transmission called the attachment an “Oferta Vinculante”, but the instrument was conditional. Final acceptance, committee approval, definitive facility, condition satisfaction or waiver, closing and drawdown remain unproved. |
| Ben Oldman route | The repository identifies a separate Ben Oldman financing workstream among the parallel routes under examination. | It is an identified route, not a located executed facility, final lender approval, closing or drawdown. |
| Lagune / Elaia alternative | Lagune Hospitalidad / Groupe Batipart signed a €26m own-funds proposal that was expressly indicative and non-binding. Aweswell separately signed a conditional preferred-right letter addressed to Elaia Investment Spain SOCIMI, S.A. | Seller acceptance on the Lagune LOI and Elaia acceptance on the separate letter were blank; board approval, due diligence, definitive SPA, clean title and closing were outstanding. The record does not establish that Lagune was Elaia’s subsidiary or that Elaia accepted a binding take-out. |
| Court, AC, collateral and adverse-perimeter dependencies | The documentary finance conditions expressly required judicial mortgage authority and an AC debt certificate, while diligence, valuation, access, collateral preservation and delivery were material to the staged-security route. The record also supports a later incomplete interior inspection amid the access conflict. | Gil alleges that private-control acts and institutional acts or omissions disabled those inputs. Third-party valuation, owner, lender and committee decisions remained independent conditions; the exact failure, prevention, waiver and causal effect of each condition require a condition-by-condition ledger. |
Spanish criminal law separately addresses knowingly issuing an unjust judicial resolution, grossly negligent issuance of a manifestly unjust resolution, refusal to judge without legal cause and malicious delay intended to achieve an illegitimate purpose. Any commission-by-omission theory also requires a legally equivalent duty and the necessary subjective element. “The judge did not grant the requested remedy” is not by itself prevarication.
Every alleged act must be classified under the criminal provision in force when it occurred, subject to retroactive application of a later law more favourable to the accused under Criminal Code Article 2.2. The current consolidated Code is a research entry point, not authority to project later wording backwards.
The identified allegation concerns Magistrate-Judge Alberto López Villarrubia. Controlled notice/decision nodes include a 27 April 2017 filing, a reported 13 June 2018 discussion, the 4/17 February 2021 filing/registration, the signed 24 February 2021 order and Sentencia 163/2023. Contrary or corrective acts—including the 26 June 2018 suspension, 24 October 2019 non-validation and partly estimatory aspects of the 2021 order—must remain in the same matrix. Informal or draft material is not attributed to the judge without receipt proof.
Exceptional case law concerning omission in administrative prevarication cannot be transferred automatically to jurisdictional conduct. The allegation must be classified through the exact resolution, refusal or deliberate delay under Criminal Code Articles 446–449.
| Required element | Question |
|---|
| Exact judge and capacity | Which judge, court, date and procedural function? |
| Matter properly before court | Which filing, evidence, request and receipt? |
| Competence and duty | What lawful power and duty to decide, protect or restore existed? |
| Affirmative resolution/refusal/delay/omission | What precise judicial conduct—including adoption of a premise or consequence—is alleged criminal? |
| Evidence before actor | What did the judge demonstrably know then? |
| Objective injustice/arbitrariness | Why is the act more than an appealable error or debatable interpretation? |
| Knowledge and purpose | What proves knowing injustice or malicious illegitimate purpose? |
| Exit causation and benefit | Which condition depended on the court, which act frustrated or preserved the alternative, and what control, loss or private advantage followed? |
Publication boundary.The website records the direct allegation and the proof matrix. It does not announce a judicial crime as established. The existence of a complaint, CGPJ filing or institutional receipt proves procedural notice—not its merits.